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 Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer Taxation 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan* 
 
This article is the third in a series examining the 
continued relevance and philosophical legitimacy of the 
United States wealth transfer tax system from within a 
particular philosophical perspective.  The article examines 
the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill and his philosophical 
progeny and distinguishes the philosophical approach of 
utilitarianism from contemporary welfare economics, 
primarily on the basis of the concept of “utility” in each 
approach.  After explicating the utilitarian criteria for ethical 
action, the article goes on to think through what Mill’s 
utilitarianism says about the taxation of wealth and wealth 
transfers, the United States federal wealth transfer tax 
system as it stands today, and what structural changes 
might improve the system under a utilitarian framework. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A nation’s tax laws can be seen as its manifested 
distributive justice ideals.  While it is clear that the United 
States’ Tax Code contains a variety of provisions aimed at 
particular non-distributive justice goals,1 underneath the 
political rhetoric and backroom deals, our tax and transfer 
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Business Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law, and the University of 
Kentucky College of Law Brown Bag Workshop, as well as Professors Albertina 
Antognini, Richard Ausness, Stefan Bird-Pollan, Zach Bray, Jake Brooks, Miranda 
Perry Fleischer, Brian Frye, Brian Galle, Michael Healy, Kathy Moore, Katherine 
Pratt, Ted Seto, and Andrew Woods.  Thank you also to K.B. Alex Nguyen and 
other members of the Arkansas Law Review for careful and thoughtful editing.   
1.  These goals range from the basic goals of revenue raising and the funding 
of government projects to incentive goals encouraging such things as the purchase 
of business equipment, the provision of employee health insurance by employers, 
or the installation of solar panels in residential homes.  26 U.S.C. §§ 25D, 106, 179 
(2012). 
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systems embody (or should embody) the model of 
distributive justice that we as a nation have endorsed.2  
Unfortunately, these ideals often get lost or smothered 
under political debates.  Even if it were possible to 
understand a nation’s fundamental distributive justice 
goals, pushing those goals through the political sausage-
making machine makes it difficult to identify the 
foundational beliefs in the resulting legislation.3  One of 
the problems of seeing tax law as a manifestation of 
distributive justice is that in a nation as large as the United 
States, it is difficult to argue that the nation as a whole has 
one coherent set of distributive justice beliefs.4  Indeed, it 
would be absurd to make such a claim in 2016, when the 
country appears more politically divided than it has ever 
been.5 
Because of the political differences among the 
contemporary American citizenry, lawmakers ought to 
consider any tax policy proposals (indeed, policy 
proposals of any kind) from the perspectives of the major 
political views endorsed by the citizenry.  In an attempt to 
contribute to this discussion, this article is the third in a 
series that examines the United States’ federal wealth 
transfer taxes from the perspective of a particular set of 
 
2.  Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608 (1996).   
3.  There is much written about the complexity of the Code and about the 
structural reasons our legislative process often results in such messy rules.  One 
cynical interpretation of this is that “[i]f Congress were to bind itself to make no 
major changes in tax law during the next congressional session—or ever again—
the contributions would start to dry up, these members’ lunch and dinner invitations 
would taper off, and so on.”  JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 171 (4th ed. 2008). 
4.  Even when the review of arguments for distributive justice is limited to 
academic theories, it remains difficult to articulate a coherent view of the “right” 
distributive justice outcome.  It is the lack of intellectual coherence on equity 
questions that results in the view that equity is less important than efficiency.  
James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2008). 
5.  See PEW RESEARCH CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC: HOW INCREASING IDEOLOGICAL UNIFORMITY AND PARTISAN ANTIPATHY 
AFFECT POLITICS, COMPROMISE AND EVERYDAY LIFE 6-7 (2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/ 
[https://perma.cc/GC45-4JSA]. 
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beliefs about distributive justice.6  Distributive justice asks 
whether any particular distribution of wealth within a 
society is more just than another, or whether justice 
demands a redistribution of the current state of wealth 
distribution.7  Thinking about the American citizenry’s 
views of distributive justice can inform tax policy decisions 
and help legislators draft tax rules that most accurately 
reflect the wishes of the population they represent.  
Democracy, of course, is meant to elicit the views of a 
majority of the citizens, and then enact those views as a 
series of laws.8  However, even if we believed our 
democracy did that effectively, it would still mean that, 
potentially, a sizable minority of citizens would not 
necessarily have their political beliefs reflected in the 
nation’s laws. 
Because the United States is not comprised entirely 
of people who share one set of philosophical beliefs,9 in 
this series of articles I consider some of the most 
commonly endorsed philosophical belief systems, and 
then examine one important element of the federal tax 
system— the wealth transfer taxes—through the lens of 
that belief system.  My work uses wealth transfer taxes 
rather than the income tax to consider the consequences 
of those belief systems, both because wealth transfer 
taxation is more purely the site of redistribution in the 
Code and because the U.S. federal income tax does 
significant work beyond redistribution.10  This combination 
 
6.  See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls, Equality of 
Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713, 713 (2014) 
(proposing that an inheritance or accessions tax best fits the Rawlsian philosophy 
of equality of opportunity, which is at the heart of much American thought) 
[hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege]; Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, 
and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 
1, 1 (2013) (exploring the estate tax from the perspective of Robert Nozick’s 
libertarian philosophical viewpoint) [hereinafter Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and 
Property]. 
7.  See Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6, at 22.  
8.  See, e.g., Democracy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
9.  Indeed, if one examines recent elections within the United States, one 
might conclude that philosophical (and political) beliefs are more diametrically 
opposed than they have ever been.  See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 5, at 6. 
10.  The U.S. federal income tax is the location of significant policy-making in 
this country, in addition to being the source of satisfaction of most revenue-raising 
goals.  Gerald Prante & Scott Hodge, The Distribution of Tax and Spending 
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of factors makes the United States federal wealth transfer 
tax system a uniquely interesting place to examine the 
way in which particular distributive justice ideals, which 
seem to be endorsed by the American populace, are (or 
are not) manifested in law.  A loose form of utilitarianism 
(the judgment that the best action is the one that 
maximizes overall “utility” to the greatest degree) is an 
extremely popular view in contemporary American 
politics.11  Individuals on both sides of the political aisle 
make utilitarian arguments in support of their views.12  In 
particular the language of “increasing the pie” appears in 
discussions of tax reform and debates about social welfare 
programs, regardless of the speakers’ belief about how 
that newly expanded pie should be allocated.13  While 
discussions of this growing pie are often Rawlsian in 
 
Policies in the United States, TAX FOUND., 
http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/SR211.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BVZ4-6N2T].  Through the use of tax expenditure programs (so-
called “government spending”), the Code creates incentives for particular behavior.  
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 1, 3 (1985).  
Furthermore, the income tax generates the vast majority of federal revenues.  
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 2016 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 53 (2016), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51580-
LTBO-2.pdf (providing a long-term budget outlook up to 2046) 
[https://perma.cc/GM8F-89FZ].  For these reasons, among others, discussion of 
the wealth transfer taxes, rather than the income tax, provides space for a more 
explicit examination of the philosophical reasons for taxation.  For a more robust 
discussion of why this project focuses on wealth transfer taxes rather than on 
income taxes, see Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property, supra note 6, 
especially Part II. 
11.  See generally Philip Harvey, Human Rights and Economic Policy 
Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights Seriously, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 363, 406 (2002) (noting that many political conflicts in the United States arise 
in part due to “the utility maximizing preferences of a majority of the population.”). 
12.  See Russell Hardin, The Utilitarian Logic of Liberalism, 97 ETHICS 47, 48-
49 (1986) (arguing “morally defensible rights” are grounded in utilitarian concepts); 
John Lawrence Hill, A Theory of Merit, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 30 (2002) 
(asserting that “contemporary thinking on the right is broadly utilitarian in its 
commitments”); Michael D. Stark, Millian Republicans v. Benthamian Democrats 
(November 12, 2012), https://michaeldstark.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/millian-
republicans-v-benthamian-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/6NAZ-5YDL]. 
13.  In an editorial discussion of tax reform, former FDIC chairwoman Sheila 
Bair (a self-proclaimed conservative Republican) described the Republicans as “a 
party that prides itself on increasing the pie, not redividing it.”  Sheila C. Blair, 
Grand Old Parity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A25. 
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nature,14 there is a distinctly utilitarian bent to such 
discussions as well, since more pie means more utility, 
making choices that produce more value for more people 
the appropriate choices under a utilitarian model.15  This 
utilitarian language, manifested primarily in twenty-first 
century debates as the language of economics, exercises 
significant authority in contemporary political 
discussions.16  In this article, I take up classical 
utilitarianism, in particular as articulated by John Stuart 
Mill, and apply it to an analysis of the United States’ 
wealth transfer tax regime. 
Utilitarianism has been adopted and transformed in 
contemporary political theory into welfare economics.17  In 
this article, I will demonstrate why a consideration of 
classical utilitarianism, in its most philosophically rigorous 
manifestation, can offer something beyond the traditional 
welfare economics arguments.  Further, I will show that 
Mill’s utilitarianism is consistent with a robust, heavily 
redistributive, wealth transfer tax system.  This article 
should not be taken as an endorsement of the utilitarian 
position.  Rather, I explicate classical utilitarianism and 
then adopt it for purposes of the article in order to apply its 
precepts to an examination of the taxation of wealth 
transfers. 
The structure of the article proceeds as follows:  Part I 
introduces the problem and the structure of the article.  
Part II explains the history and current state of wealth 
transfer taxation in the United States.  Part III articulates 
the classical utilitarian ethical theory, its adaptation into 
the theory of welfare economics, and the important 
distinctions between the two approaches.  Part IV applies 
 
14.  Jason Brennan, Rawl’s Distributive Justice, 
https://www.libertarianism.org/guides/lectures/rawlss-distributive-justice 
[https://perma.cc/4YTA-9ZXL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).  
15.  See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2004) (assuming that “improving aggregate social 
welfare, as measured by the individual utility levels or happiness of the population, 
remains one important goal of tax policy.”). 
16.  See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: 
Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485, 1487 n.8 (2014). 
17.  For a further discussion of this claim, see infra note 60. 
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classical utilitarianism to an evaluation of the taxation of 
wealth transfers.  Part V concludes. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL WEALTH 
TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 
A. History of the System 
The United States wealth transfer tax system has 
three elements: the estate tax, the gift tax, and the 
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax.18  In place since 
1916, the estate tax is the central component of the 
system and imposes an excise tax on the transfer of 
wealth at death.19  The federal gift tax serves as a 
backstop to the estate tax, ensuring that wealth 
transferred during the donor’s lifetime, rather than held 
until death, will also be subjected to the imposition of the 
tax.20  The GST tax imposes another layer of tax on 
 
18.  Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the 
Federal Wealth Transfer System (March 18, 2015), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744, at 1-3 
[https://perma.cc/U5V6-LJLR].  The federal estate tax (a tax on transfers made to 
surviving heirs at the death of the donor) was first enacted in the United States in 
1916.  Id. at 5.  The first estate tax was enacted without an accompanying gift tax.  
Id. at 6.  As a result, the tax could easily be avoided if the donor transferred the 
majority of her assets tax-free during her lifetime, rather than waiting until death to 
pass on her wealth.  Id. at 5.  Congress realized that the estate tax was nearly 
powerless without a gift tax, and, as a result, the first gift tax (a tax on gratuitous 
transfers made during the donor’s lifetime) was enacted in 1924 but repealed in 
1926.  Id. at 6.  The modern gift tax was enacted in 1932, and the United States 
has had both gift and estate taxes since then, with the exception of the one-year 
repeal of the estate tax in 2010.  Id. at 6, 10.  The GST tax, imposed to ensure that 
wealth transfer taxation cannot be avoided by making a transfer to an heir who is 
not an immediate descendant of the transferor, was first enacted in 1976 and has 
been in place in its current form since 1986.  Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & 
Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 118, 118-24 
(2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HR-
E2WE]. 
19.  Id. at 118.  The estate tax is imposed at a current rate of forty percent on 
amounts in excess of the 2014 unified credit exemption equivalent amount of 
$5,340,000.  26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (2012); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra 
note 18, at 12. 
20.  26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012).  The Code imposes an excise tax on the 
gratuitous transfer of wealth during the donor’s lifetime if the transfer exceeds the 
lifetime unified credit exemption equivalent amount of $5,340,000.  Joint 
Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 12.  The gift tax is statutorily linked to 
the estate tax, so the tax is imposed at the rate of forty percent in 2014.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 2001. 
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gratuitous transfers (either during lifetime or after death) 
made to recipients more than one generation removed 
from the donor.21 
The year 2016 marks the 100th anniversary of the 
estate tax.  Tracing the history of the tax demonstrates a 
remarkable shrinking of the tax over time.22  Throughout 
their history, the wealth transfer taxes have been 
assessed against varying percentages of the population.  
At their peak in 1976, eight percent of adult deaths 
resulted in estates that were subject to the estate tax.23  In 
2011 an estimated 0.13% of adult deaths resulted in 
estates that were subject to the tax.24  In terms of total tax 
revenues collected through the wealth transfer taxes, the 
taxes were at their peak in 1972, when 2.6% of total tax 
revenues came from the estate and gift taxes.25  By 
contrast, in 2013 estate tax revenues represented only 
0.6% of total United States federal tax revenues.26 
B. Mechanics of the United States Wealth Transfer 
Taxes 
The modern estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer 
of wealth.27  Many (although perhaps not all) of the 
fundamental goals of wealth transfer taxation could be 
 
21.  The Code imposes a tax (in addition to taxes imposed under § 2001 and 
§ 2501) on direct transfers or distributions from a trust to a “skip person.”  26 
U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).  In addition to the unified credit against estate and gift taxes 
available under § 2010, there is a lifetime credit against the GST tax equivalent to 
an exemption amount, in 2014, of $5,340,000.  26 U.S.C. § 2631 (2012) 
(referencing § 2010); Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 12.  
Transfers in excess of the exemption equivalent amount are taxed at forty percent 
in 2014.  26 U.S.C. § 2602 (2012) (referencing § 2001).  
22.  See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 121-28. 
23.  Id. at 125. 
24.  In 2011, only 0.13% of adult deaths resulted in estates that were subject 
to the estate tax.  Historical Returns as Percentage of Deaths, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/statistics/historical-returns-percentage-deaths 
[https://perma.cc/8G5L-B3K3]. 
25.  Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 18, at 125. 
26.  CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO 
FEDERAL REVENUES COME FROM? 2 (2015), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/PolicyBasics_WhereDoFederalT
axRevsComeFrom_08-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JYR-BBVY]. 
27.  “A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of every 
decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.”  26 U.S.C. § 2001(a) 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
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achieved through the imposition of a direct tax on the 
wealth of an individual.28  Such a tax, operating like the 
relatively common property taxes in place in many local 
tax jurisdictions, could levy a tax on the current value of an 
individual’s assets.  A federal wealth tax could be 
assessed annually or more or less frequently; it could be 
either flat or graduated; it could be a tax on all holdings or 
only those above a certain exemption amount; and it could 
be uniform across households or vary based on age or 
family size.  While the many options for imposing a wealth 
tax might make it seem an attractive option, a 
constitutional prohibition on direct taxes that are not 
proportional makes a wealth tax impossible without a 
constitutional amendment in the United States.29  
However, the structure of the estate tax, as an indirect tax 
on the act of transferring wealth, rather than a direct tax on 
the holding of wealth, is permitted under the United States’ 
constitutional regime.30  Current law unifies the estate and 
gift tax so that tax is also imposed on so-called “lifetime 
transfers.”  Wealth transfers are taxed in the same way 
whether they occur before or after the death of the 
transferor.31  In practice, the estate, gift, and GST taxes 
 
28.  Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 HOW. L.J. 
319, 330 (2010). 
29.  Id. at 330.  For a discussion of the possibility of a wealth tax, and 
specifically exploring the use of a wealth tax as a means of funding reparations, 
see, e.g., id. at 330-35; David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive 
Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000) (proposing a wealth tax system).  
30.  “The framing of the tax has constitutional significance: While Congress 
may impose excise taxes subject only to the uniformity requirement, any direct tax 
on property must be apportioned among the States.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 
1 & § 9, cl. 4.  By imposing the tax on the value of the taxable estate that is 
transferred by reason of the decedent’s death (as opposed to the value of the 
property in the decedent’s hands just prior to his death), the estate tax falls 
comfortably within the excise category.”  BRANT J. HELLWIG & ROBERT T. 
DANFORTH, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1 (2d ed. 2013). 
31.  While the structure of the gift tax and the estate tax is the same, there is, 
in fact, still a benefit to transferring assets during one’s lifetime, due to the tax-
exclusive nature of the gift tax.  The estate tax is assessed on the value of the 
assets held by the decedent at death.  26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012).  By its very 
nature, then, the estate tax is “tax-inclusive,” meaning that the amount paid in tax 
will, itself, be subject to the tax.  By contrast, the gift tax is a tax on the amount 
transferred by gift.  26 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012).  Therefore, the amount subject to the 
gift tax does not include the amount of the tax.  For example, assume a unified 
estate and gift tax rate of fifty percent.  Making a post-tax transfer of $100,000 will 
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are all imposed at a flat rate of forty percent, although the 
statute imposing the tax actually includes a graduated rate 
structure.32  Because of the lifetime exemption equivalent 
credit, no transfers are taxed at any rate under the highest 
forty percent rate.  All transfers within the lower brackets 
are exempted from the tax.33  Under 2016 law, a taxpayer 
can transfer a total of $5.45 million tax-free during her 
lifetime.34  The current lifetime credit can also be shared 
between spouses, meaning that all married couples are 
entitled to a total amount of $10.9 million of tax-free 
transfers.35 
The current form of the wealth transfer tax (with a 
$5.45 million lifetime exemption, indexed for inflation, and 
a forty-percent tax rate on transfers over that amount) 
arose as the result of a political compromise in the first 
days of 2013.36  Legislation passed under President 
 
require $200,000 of assets if the amount is transferred after death ($200,000 of 
assets x fifty percent tax rate results in $100,000 tax liability, leaving $100,000 of 
assets for the heir), while making an inter vivos transfer of $100,000 requires only 
$150,000 of assets ($100,000 gift transfer x fifty percent tax on transfer incurs 
$50,000 tax liability – total amount required to make the transfer is $150,000).  In 
that sense, inter vivos gifts are “cheaper” to make than post-death transfers. 
32.  26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012) begins with a tax rate 18% on the first $10,000 
transferred, and gradually climbs to the current maximum rate of 40%.  However, 
as the current exemption equivalent credit of $5.45 million well exceeds the bottom 
of the 40% bracket (currently the 40% bracket affects transfers in excess of 
$1,000,000), no transfers are subject to the tax rates in the lower brackets. 
33.  Id. 
34.  26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
35.  Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615.  Beginning with the 2011 tax 
year, the Code permitted unused portions of the lifetime credit to transfer to the 
surviving spouse upon the death of the first spouse.  Joint Committee on Taxation, 
supra note 18, at 11.  Before then, a significant amount of estate planning, in 
particular the use of so-called “QTIP trusts” centered on ensuring that the entirety 
of an individual’s unified credit was used up, rather than allowing a portion of it to 
expire while the surviving spouse held assets in excess of the unified credit 
amount.  26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012).  See also HELLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 30, 
at 354-56, 374. 
36.  Congress and President Obama signed the American Taxpayer Relief 
Act (ATRA) to avoid going over the so-called “fiscal cliff.”  CCH Tax Briefing, 
President Signs Eleventh-Hour Agreement to Avert Fiscal Cliff (January 3, 2013), 
http://tax.cchgroup.com/downloads/files/pdfs/legislation/ATPR.pdf.  The agreement 
was reached in the final hours of 2012, and the bill was signed into law on January 
2, 2013.  Colleen Curtis, What You Need to Know about the Bipartisan Tax 
Agreement (January 2, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/01/01/what-
you-need-know-about-bipartisan-tax-agreement [https://perma.cc/9RCM-9EET].  
The law sets the estate tax lifetime exemption-equivalent credit at $5 million, 
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George W. Bush in 2001 phased out the estate tax with a 
full repeal scheduled for 2010.37  Because the legislation 
did not garner the requisite number of votes in Congress 
to become permanent, all of the so-called “Bush tax cuts” 
were sunset provisions, meaning they would disappear 
from the Code on December 31, 2010 without further 
legislative action.38  President Obama and the 2010 
Congress enacted legislation on December 17, 2010; 
however, the legislation was merely a patch, and that 
legislation expired on December 31, 2012.39  Finally, on 
January 2, 2013, the American Taxpayer Relief Act 
(ATRA) was enacted, making changes to the wealth 
transfer taxes permanent and resulting in the tax rate and 
exemption amount in place today.40 
 
adjusted annually for inflation (which brings it to $5.34 million in 2014) and sets the 
tax rate at a flat forty percent for amounts in excess of that amount.  26 U.S.C. §§ 
2001, 2010 (2012).  The new law does not have a sunset date, and thus will not 
have to be extended by another Congressional vote.   
37.  Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10.  Before President 
Bush and the 2001 Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), the Code provided a lifetime credit against 
tax of $675,000.  26 U.S.C. § 2010(b) (2012).  Any transfers made, whether inter 
vivos or after death, that exceeded the credit amount were taxed at fifty-five 
percent.  26 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012).  EGTRRA slowly increased the lifetime credit 
amount and simultaneously lowered the rate, culminating in a one-year repeal of 
the estate tax in 2010.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE 
BRIEF: FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 1 (2009) [hereinafter GIFT TAXES]. 
38.  The peculiarities of EGTRRA resulted in a complete sunset of the law on 
December 31, 2010.  2 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 239 (2009) 
[hereinafter BUDGET OPTIONS]. 
39.  Id.  Congress and President Obama signed the Tax Relief, 
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (the Tax 
Relief Act), a two-year extension of the EGTRRA provisions, including a 
reinstitution of the estate tax with a $5 million lifetime credit (indexed for inflation) 
and a thirty-five percent rate on amounts transferred above the credit amount.  
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 18, at 10-11.  That extension expired on 
December 31, 2012, at which point the estate and gift tax credit and rate were 
scheduled to revert to 2001 levels.  BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 38.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that extending the EGTRRA estate and gift 
tax provisions that lowered the transfer tax rate and increased the lifetime credit 
amount would have cost approximately $402 billion over the period of 2010 to 
2019, as compared with the revenue that would have been raised if EGTRRA had 
been allowed to expire.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE TO THE BUDGET AND 
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022 34 (2012); BUDGET OPTIONS, 
supra note 38, at 239-40.  Leaving the 2009 rates and exemption levels in place 
would have raised a total of $420 billion (or 1.2% of total revenues) from 2010 to 
2019.  See GIFT TAXES, supra note 37, at 5. 
40.  HELLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 30, at 17-18. 
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In addition to amounts that are transferred as “gifts” 
within the definition of the Code,41 taxpayers can annually 
transfer up to a specific amount outside of the definition of 
gift, under the annual exclusion amount.42  In 2016, a 
taxpayer can transfer up to $14,000 per recipient with no 
obligation to report the transfer on any tax return or pay 
gift tax on the transfer.43  Such a transfer does not use up 
any of the individual’s lifetime unified credit, since amounts 
under the annual exclusion fall outside of the Code’s 
definition of “taxable gift.”44  In addition, transferors can 
pay the tuition and medical expenses of any individual 
without subjecting those payments to wealth transfer 
taxation, as long as the payments are made directly to the 
provider of the services.45  The annual exclusion was 
originally intended as a simplifying mechanism, allowing 
“normal” family transfers (gifts on holidays and birthdays, 
vacations, even a teenager’s first car) to pass outside of 
the transfer tax regime.  However, aggressive estate 
planning has resulted in the use of the annual exclusion 
for significant cash transfers, including in the popular 
Crummey Trust context.46  One suspects, however, that 
 
41.  Importantly, and to the chagrin of law students everywhere, the term “gift” 
means something different in the gift tax regime than it does in the income tax 
regime.  The income tax definition of gift, resulting in an increase in wealth to the 
recipient that is excluded from the recipient’s income under 26 U.S.C. § 102, 
comes from the famous Supreme Court case Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 
(1960).  The Supreme Court articulated the standard, still prevalent today, that a 
gift stems from “detached and disinterested generosity” on the part of the donor.  
Id. at 285.  By contrast, the gift tax has a statutory definition of the term “gift” that 
does not investigate the donor’s motives.  “Where property is transferred for less 
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money’s worth, then the 
amount by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration 
shall be deemed a gift . . . .”  26 U.S.C. § 2512(b) (2012). 
42.  26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(1) (2012). 
43.  26 U.S.C. § 2503(b)(2) (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
44.  26 U.S.C. § 2503(a)-(b) (2012). 
45.  26 U.S.C. § 2503(e) (2012).  For a critique of the exclusion of transfers to 
pay for health care and education under § 2503, see Kerry A. Ryan, Human 
Capital and Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 223, 227-29 (2010). 
46.  Crummey trusts, named for the first taxpayer to successfully defend the 
use of this tax strategy in court, allow a contribution to a trust to qualify for the 
annual exclusion, as long as the transfer satisfies certain technical requirements, 
used to make the transfer more like a current transfer.  For an explanation of the 
mechanics and uses of Crummey trusts, see Kent A. Mason, An Analysis of 
Crummey and the Annual Exclusion, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 573, 577-92 (1982). 
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parents using Crummey Trusts and other planning 
techniques to transfer $14,000 per year to each of their 
children are likely making those traditional “gifts” as well.47  
Transfers like these would violate both the intention and 
the letter of the law.48  The combination of all of these 
provisions allows taxpayers to transfer a significant 
amount of wealth without paying any wealth transfer taxes, 
or using up any of the lifetime credit.49 
While the wealth transfer taxes are collecting less in 
revenue now than they did in prior years,50 at least in part 
because the tax rates on these transfers have been 
reduced51 and the exemption amount has been 
increased,52 the reduction in the collection of revenues 
can also be attributed, at least in part, to a non-statutory 
change.  Aggressive estate planning strategies have 
reduced the base of the tax by reducing the value of 
wealth held by taxpayers.53  Through the use of entities 
such as family limited partnerships, taxpayers reduce the 
 
47.  Id. at 604; Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. 
48.  Mason, supra note 46, at 604. 
49.  A married taxpayer with two children could transfer to her children up to 
$56,000 per year outside of the transfer tax regime, by transferring $28,000 to 
each child and then making an election to have half of the amount treated as being 
transferred from the taxpayer’s spouse.  On top of that, daycare costs, private 
school tuition, university tuition and fees and all medical expenses can be paid 
without reporting any of these amounts on a gift tax return.  Frequently Asked 
Questions on Gift Taxes, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/frequently-asked-
questions-on-gift-taxes [https://perma.cc/4GQN-VGZ9]. 
50.  CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, supra note 26. 
51.  In the year 2001, the estate tax was assessed at a flat rate of fifty-five 
percent.  Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, Exemptions, and Exclusions, 1916-
2014, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates], 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/federal-estate-and-gift-tax-rates-exemptions-and-
exclusions-1916-2014 [https://perma.cc/9AN4-ZL7Z].  In 2016, it is only forty 
percent.  26 U.S.C. § 2001(c) (2012). 
52.  In the year 2001, the unified credit provided an exemption equivalent 
amount of $675,000.  Federal Estate and Gift Tax Rates, supra note 51.  In 2016, 
that amount is $5.45 million.  26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-
44 I.R.B. 615.  This exponential increase in the size of the exemption amount has 
taken a significant number of estates out of the pool of estates subject to the 
estate tax.  Ten Facts You Should Know About the Federal Estate Tax, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-
tax/ten-facts-you-should-know-about-the-federal-estate-tax 
[https://perma.cc/PG7E-NM6Q]. 
53.  Brant J. Hellwig, On Discounted Partnership Interests and Adequate 
Consideration, 28 VA. TAX REV. 531, 536-37 (2009). 
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value for estate tax purposes of the assets held in their 
estates, and since tax liability is a product of base times 
rate, the reduction in the value of the estate (the tax base) 
results in a reduction in overall tax liability.54  The United 
States Tax Court has been relatively sympathetic to 
taxpayers using aggressive estate planning strategies, 
which has resulted in a dramatic decrease in estate tax 
revenue.55 
Given the significant evolution of the wealth transfer 
tax regime in the past fifteen years, it is at best unclear 
what the future of the taxation of wealth transfers in the 
United States will look like.  While the current legislation 
will not expire without action by Congress, there is a vocal 
contingent of opponents to the estate tax who fight against 
its continued existence.56  The rhetoric of the “death tax” 
and the misconception that the estate tax is the end of 
small business and family farms in the United States 
 
54.  A Family Limited Partnership (FLP) works by reducing the valuation of 
the assets in an estate by placing those assets in a partnership and then imposing 
restrictions on the partnership interests.  Hellwig, supra note 53, at 535.  Typically, 
the owner of the assets creates a partnership, places the assets in question inside 
the trust, and then imposes restrictions on the voting rights or transferability of the 
interests in that partnership.  Id.  The creator of the partnership then transfers 
those partnership interests to family members either during the transferor’s 
lifetime, or includes an estate plan that will transfer the partnership interests after 
the transferor’s death.  Id.  Because of the restrictions placed on the partnership 
interests, the transferor claims that the value of the partnership interest should be 
less than the value of the proportionate share of the underlying assets.  Id. at 577.  
In many instances the assets included in the FLP are readily marketable assets 
such as publicly traded securities.  Id. at 543.  However, since the assets are 
owned by a partnership and there are restrictions on the partnership interests, the 
discounted valuation is generally accepted by the I.R.S.  Hellwig, supra note 53, at 
533 n.2.  “Because property is valued on an objective basis for estate and gift tax 
purposes, the contribution of property capable of ready valuation to a partnership 
followed by the transfer of beneficial interests in the entity serves to suppress 
transfer tax value on two independent grounds.  First, the partnership interest may 
be discounted to reflect its lack of marketability . . . . Second, a transferee of a 
limited partnership interest is not entitled to participate in management decisions.”  
Id. at 535-36.  Discounts can be significant, sometimes nearing thirty percent.  Id. 
at 536. 
55.  Id. at 542-44. 
56.  For a robust analysis of the political campaign aimed at eliminating the 
estate tax completely, and potentially using the elimination of the estate tax as a 
first step towards the large-scale reduction of federal taxation generally, see 
generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE 
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005) (presenting the saga of the fight 
over the death tax). 
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continues to make the estate tax unpopular, even among 
individuals who would never be subject to the tax.57  
Despite this opposition, some scholars (perhaps overly 
cynically) argue that, as a political matter, the estate tax 
will never be eliminated, as politicians who collect 
contributions from estate tax opponents are unwilling to 
sacrifice the issue completely.58  However, there is little 
evidence that the estate tax is, in fact, inconsistent with 
the political and philosophical beliefs of most Americans.  
In reality, it seems the opposite is true.59  Part of the work 
of this article and the others in this series is to 
demonstrate that the continued existence of wealth 
transfer taxation in some form is both philosophically 
important and consistent with the beliefs of most 
Americans. 
 
57.  See Zachary Mider, The Estate Tax: U.S. Rich Follow Rockefeller’s Lead 
in Hunt for Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/the-
estate-tax [https://perma.cc/M7XS-WAKK] (last updated Aug. 8, 2016); Paul 
Waldman, The Oddly Unpopular Estate Tax, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 16, 
2010), http://prospect.org/article/oddly-unpopular-estate-tax 
[https://perma.cc/S9WC-TEGW]. 
58.  “The secret is not that special interests give boatloads of money to 
politicians . . . . The dirty little secret I come to lay bare is that Congress likes it this 
way.  Congress wants there to be special interests, small groups with high stakes 
in what it does or does not do.  These are necessary conditions for Congress to 
get what it needs:  money, for itself and its campaigns . . . . For the estate tax, 
there are two opposing sides [to the shakedown game].  The repeal of the tax 
would be a good outcome for the wealthy families in the tax’s target range and a 
bad outcome for the financiers and others who benefit, big time, from the very 
existence of the tax and the planning it pushes many wealthy people to do.  No 
matter what Congress does, at least two sets of players – billionaire families on the 
one hand and their estate-planning advisers and financial institutions on the other 
– will always be willing to play because of the estate tax’s high stakes.”  Edward J. 
McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN. L. REV. 21, 21, 
23 (2012). 
59.  “Given how clearly the estate tax lines up with American notions of 
fairness, it should enjoy wider support.  The beauty of a free-market system is the 
absence of a special elite that judges who gets what – consumers vote with their 
dollars for the goods and services that best fit their needs (at least in theory).  
Inherited wealth goes against this model:  As Warren Buffet has said, ‘The idea 
that you get a lifetime of privately funded food stamps based on coming out of the 
right womb strikes at my idea of fairness.’  Indeed, it’s surprising that many of the 
same people who oppose welfare on the grounds that its benefits are not tied to 
work can so stridently denounce estate taxes, thus endorsing a system that allows 
people to receive vast amounts of money without putting in any work.”  Stephen 
Martin, America’s Un-American Resistance to the Estate Tax, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
23, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/resistance-estate-
tax/470403/ [https://perma.cc/77K3-RVHA]. 
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III.  WHAT IS UTILITARIANISM? 
The language of welfare economics often dominates 
modern day tax policy discussions.60  Stemming from the 
work of Adam Smith, through Ricardo and Musgrave, 
among others, and articulated in contemporary 
discussions by Louis Kaplow and others, welfare 
economics arguments have a distinctly utilitarian bent.61  
Much has been written by welfare economists about the 
estate tax and wealth transfer taxes, as well as about tax 
policy more generally.62  If utilitarianism were nothing 
more than welfare economics, this article would not be 
adding significantly to the conversation.  However, welfare 
economics has focused on a particular aspect of 
utilitarianism, and has left behind some of the unique 
elements of the theory that contributed to the evolution of 
the ethical debate in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.63  In this Part, I will explicate the original theory 
of utilitarianism as proposed first by Jeremy Bentham and 
then endorsed by John Stuart Mill, including in his treatise 
of the same name.  I will then identify how utilitarianism is 
distinct from welfare economics, and how it has evolved in 
the nearly 150 years since Mill’s book was published. 
A. Classical Utilitarianism 
 
60.  Jon Bakija, Social Welfare, Income Inequality, and Tax Progressivity: A 
Primer on Modern Economic Theory and Evidence, 
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/bakija/BakijaSocialWelfareIncomeInequalityAnd
TaxProgressivity.pdf (noting that optimal income taxation in the economic literature 
is focused on addressing the question of how to maximize social welfare) 
[https://perma.cc/3LSP-UUH5].  “The classical economists, especially the three 
most famous of them, Adam Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, were utilitarians.”  JOHN 
PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 111 (1949). 
61.  Much of the discussion in contemporary tax policy begins from utilitarian 
premises, even when those premises go unacknowledged.  See Fleischer, supra 
text accompanying note 16; Linda Sugin, A Philosophical Objection to the Optimal 
Tax Model, 64 TAX L. REV. 229, 230 (2011). 
62.  See generally LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC 
ECONOMICS (2008) (presenting a unified framework for evaluating and analyzing 
taxation).   
63.  See generally The History of Utilitarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ 
[https://perma.cc/RN6Y-46UC] (last updated Sept. 22, 2014) (providing a history of 
Utilitarianism, starting with Bentham and Mill to the modern day refinements of the 
philosophy). 
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Versions of the utilitarian ethical theory date as far 
back as Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus.64  The unifying 
characteristic of utilitarian theories is the idea that, rather 
than make a priori claims about the rightness or 
wrongness of any particular action, ethical evaluations 
should be consequentialist.65  That is to say, for 
utilitarians, ethics is primarily a process of examining the 
outcomes (usually the expected outcomes, rather than the 
actual outcomes, since ethical decisions must be made in 
advance of knowing the actual outcome of the choice) of 
actions and determining whether those outcomes tend 
towards the goal of the ethical theory.66  On a 
consequentialist model, actions cannot be evaluated in the 
abstract, and actions should not be evaluated based on 
the motivations behind them.67  Rather, what makes an 
action “right” for a consequentialist, as an ethical matter, is 
the degree to which that action achieves the desired 
 
64.  “Though Bentham is usually cited as the founder of utilitarianism, the 
antecedents of utilitarian principles have a far older vintage in the philosophy of 
Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, and in early Christian thought.  Other significant 
dimensions of the theory can be traced to the seventeenth-century writings of 
Hobbes, Locke, and Richard Cumberland.”  JAMES E. CRIMMINS, ON BENTHAM 2-3 
(2004). 
65.  “Utilitarianism is often described as a consequentialist theory . . . A non-
consequentialist theory, such as Kantian ethics, will claim that certain actions are 
just wrong in themselves, and not wrong because of their consequences for 
happiness or anything else.  But consequentialist theories make the rightness of 
actions depend on their consequences.  Kantian ethics may claim that murder is 
wrong in itself, while utilitarianism will claim that it is wrong only because of its 
consequences (the decrease in overall happiness brought about by the absence of 
the person killed, by the grief, distress, anxiety caused to others, and so on).”  
Roger Crisp, Introduction to J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 14 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1998) (1861). 
66.  Utilitarianism is not the only consequentialist theory, but it may be the 
best known.  Other examples of consequentialism include pragmatism, hedonism, 
and egoism.  Consequentialism, ETHICS GUIDE, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/consequentialism_1.shtml; 
Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ [https://perma.cc/2CLV-5GPK] 
(last updated Oct. 22, 2015).  There is some debate about how broadly or narrowly 
to define consequentialism, but there is at least general agreement about one 
central element of all consequentialist theories.  “Any consequentialist theory must 
accept the claim that . . . certain normative properties depend only on 
consequences.  If that claim is dropped, the theory ceases to be consequentialist.”  
Id. 
67.  Id. 
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ethical end.68  The utilitarian version of consequentialism 
evaluates the rightness and wrongness of actions by the 
degree to which those actions increase utility.69 
1. Jeremy Bentham 
In many ways, although John Stuart Mill is its most 
famous advocate, Jeremy Bentham is thought of as the 
father of utilitarianism.70  And, at least at the beginning of 
his philosophical career, Mill saw himself as extending and 
building on the work of Jeremy Bentham, a friend of Mill’s 
father, and something of a mentor to Mill himself.71  A 
social revolutionary, Bentham believed that measuring the 
good in terms of human happiness was not only more 
scientifically accurate than references to idealist criteria, 
but also that appeals to happiness would democratize 
society.72  The targets of his philosophical critique 
included, to a certain extent, idealists like Immanuel Kant, 
but also, to a greater extent, the traditional values 
espoused by most religious thinkers.73  In this regard, 
Bentham is the philosophical heir to David Hume’s 
empiricism.74  Like most consequentialist thinkers, 
Bentham believed that ethical analyses begin with facts 
 
68.  Id. 
69.  At the heart of debates among those who hold utilitarian ethical beliefs is 
the definition of “utility.”  The History of Utilitarianism , supra note 63.  Section A of 
this Part of the article explores what Mill meant by utility.  Section B examines the 
form “utility” takes in the language of welfare economists.  Finally, Section C 
highlights the differences between these two approaches.   
70.  Kiran Bhardwaj, Higher and Lower Pleasures and our Moral Psychology, 
1 RES COGITANS 126, 126 (2010). 
71.  “Mill saw himself as an advocate, and evangelist even, for utilitarianism, 
telling us later that he never gave up the greatest happiness principle . . . One of 
his first moves was to establish a group of fellow sympathizers, which met in a 
disused room at Bentham’s house.”  ROGER CRISP, MILL ON UTILITARIANISM 4 
(1997). 
72.  See ROSS ABBINNETT, POLITICS OF HAPPINESS: CONNECTING THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF HEGEL, NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA TO THE POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGIES OF HAPPINESS 22 (2013). 
73.  See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 18, 21, 25 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970). 
74.  Hume was one of the first philosophical empiricists, insisting that 
philosophy, like the other natural sciences, must begin all analysis with facts from 
the world, rather than with ideas.  1 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 7-
8 (E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1911) (1739). 
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about the world.75  Actions have consequences in the 
empirical world, and it is to that world that we must look to 
determine whether or not an action is ethical.76  Much of 
the ethical debate until this point had focused on an 
evaluation of motives and intentions, judging an action as 
good or bad on the basis of the thoughts behind it, rather 
than based on the results it produced.77  Furthermore, 
ethics had focused on the good of the community, but 
Bentham objected that the good of the community could 
only mean the good of all of the individual members of the 
community.78  This turned ethical calculations into a 
balancing act, totaling the consequences to each 
individual member of society when determining the most 
ethical action.79  Rather than speaking in abstract terms 
about the good of “mankind” or “society,” Bentham 
focused on real people and the way a particular action 
impacted the lives of those people.80  Bentham insisted 
that ethics must focus on all the consequences of an 
action for people in the world.81  However, this emphasis 
does not yet clarify what makes an action good or bad. 
The next step of Bentham’s argument was to 
establish what it means to talk of the “good” of 
individuals.82  Again, Bentham disagreed with the 
arguments of traditional thinkers in this discussion of 
ethics.  “A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for 
the interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the 
sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same 
thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains.”83  For 
 
75.  See BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 74. 
76.  See id. 
77.  See IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: GROUNDWORK OF THE 
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 64 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 2005) (1948). 
78.  “The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions 
that can occur in the phraseology of morals:  no wonder that the meaning of it is 
often lost.  When it has a meaning, it is this.  The community is a fictitious body, 
composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were 
its members.  The interest of the community then is, what? – the sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it.”  BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 
12. 
79.  Id. at 12-13, 40. 
80.  See id. at 12. 
81.  See id. at 40. 
82.  See id. at 12, 125. 
83.  BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 12. 
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Bentham, the first philosopher to robustly articulate the 
ethics of utilitarianism, an action is deemed ethical if it 
promotes pleasure and diminishes pain.84  Bentham 
ultimately equated utility with pleasure and claimed that 
ethical calculations should determine the amount of 
pleasure produced by an action.85  When compared to the 
philosophers of his time, who made ethical arguments with 
appeals to reason, or God, or natural rights, Bentham’s 
work looks radical.  Grounded firmly in the world of 
experience, Bentham refuses to make non-empirical 
judgments about the “quality” of an interest, instead 
insisting that happiness and pleasure are all just matters 
of degree.86  All pleasure is equally valuable, so more 
pleasure is just better.87 
In order to understand the way in which Mill’s 
utilitarian calculus differs from Bentham’s, one must first 
understand what Bentham means by saying an action 
increases pleasure.  First of all, unlike Mill, Bentham 
endorsed a theoretically consistent version of ethical 
hedonism.88  Bentham argued that all pleasure was equal, 
and that ethics had nothing to say about the value of one 
form of pleasure over another.89  Bentham’s philosophical 
 
84.  See id. at 11-12. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Among even those who admire Bentham’s work, there is a concern that 
he is fundamentally wrong about his position that all pleasure is the same.  For 
instance, “He saw an analogy where there was none.  He also confused 
measurements of quantity with comparisons of effects.  When a man has to 
choose between two alternative pleasures, one of which is mild but lasting and the 
other intense but brief, he never can choose the greater, for the simple reason that 
neither is the greater.  What he can do, however, is to choose the one he desires 
the more intensely.”  PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 74.  However, this flaw is 
remedied in Mill’s version of utilitarianism.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 56. 
87.  See PLAMENATZ, supra note 60, at 73. 
88.  Hedonism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/ [https://perma.cc/CJ9E-9EEB] 
(published April 20, 2004 and substantially revised October 17, 2013).  Again, 
although he is consistent, Bentham may also be wrong.  Treating all pleasure as 
inherently the same ignores real differences that seem to have effects on how that 
pleasure is experienced in the world.  “The intensity of a pleasure cannot be 
measured against its duration, nor its duration against its certainty or uncertainty, 
nor this latter property against its propinquity or remoteness.”  PLAMENATZ, supra 
note 60, at 74. 
89.  Bentham refuses to categorize kinds of pleasure, and instead measures 
pleasure (and pain) by variations in degree.  But pleasure as such is one kind of 
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account included the explication of a utilitarian calculus, 
meant to analyze the rightness and wrongness of actions 
with reference to the extent to which the action tended to 
produce more pleasure.90  Again, for Bentham, because 
all pleasures are of equal worth, the difference between 
more or less worthy actions is the degree to which the 
actions produce more or less pleasure, and the degree to 
which that pleasure is more or less intense.91  Bentham 
then argues that, in effect, ethics must perform a calculus 
with regard to all ethical decisions, totaling up the value 
(including the relative degrees of intensity) of all pleasures 
and pains produced by choosing one action and 
comparing the result to the pleasures and pains (again, 
including the intensity of those pleasures and pains) 
produced by an alternative action.92  Comparison of the 
results will then determine the correct ethical choice.93 
2. John Stuart Mill 
While Mill claims to be continuing Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, Mill ultimately disagrees with Bentham’s 
pure hedonism.94  Some pleasures are more valuable than 
 
thing, capable only of differences in degree, not in kind.  “By utility is meant that 
property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, 
good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what 
comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.”  BENTHAM, supra note 73, 
at 12. 
90.  “To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain 
considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following 
circumstances:  1. Its intensity.  2.  Its duration.  3.  Its certainty or uncertainty.  4.  
Its propinquity or remoteness.”  Id. at 38. 
91.  “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or 
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest 
is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose 
that happiness.”  Id. at 11-12. 
92.  Id. at 40. 
93.  Id. at 11-12, 40. 
94.  “Like Bentham, Mill believes that pleasantness is the only ‘good-making’ 
property.  But how valuable a pleasure is depends not only on its duration, but on 
its nature.”  MILL, supra note 65, at 12.  “It is quite compatible with the principle of 
utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and 
more valuable than others.  It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other 
things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should 
be supposed to depend on quantity alone.”  Id. at 56. 
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others, Mill argues, but the only arbiter of the value of two 
distinct pleasures, is someone who has experienced them 
both.95  Mill goes on to conclude that the quality of the so-
called “higher” pleasures is so much more intense as to 
make those pleasures incomparably better than the 
“lower” pleasures.96  As he famously claims, “It is better to 
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better 
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.  And if the 
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they 
only know their own side of the question.”97  Some have 
objected that this turn away from Bentham’s pure 
hedonism demonstrates an inconsistency in Mill’s 
theory.98  However, the mere acknowledgement that 
pleasure admits of qualitative difference does not 
necessarily entail the conclusion that there is some 
measure, other than pleasure, that determines value.99  
Indeed, as Mill himself notes, those who criticize the 
theory of utilitarianism for valuing pleasure and who claim 
that pleasure is nothing but a “base value” reveal more 
about their own understanding of pleasure, than they do 
about the coherence of utilitarianism.100 
 
95.  “Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have 
experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral 
obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure.  If one of the two is, by 
those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other 
that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of 
discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which 
their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a 
superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of 
small account.”  Id. 
96.  Id. at 57. 
97.  Id. 
98.  MILL, supra note 65, at 12. 
99.  “If a man were to say that nothing is beautiful except colour and then to 
place the colours in an order of beauty, it would not follow that he was admitting 
that anything but colour could be beautiful.  The difference between one colour and 
another is not a difference of degree, nor yet is it a difference in respect of 
anything except colour.  So, too, the higher and the lower pleasures, though 
different in kind, may yet differ only in respect of pleasure.”  Id. at 137. 
100.  Discussing the Epicureans response to those who alleged their belief 
system as a “doctrine worthy only of swine,” Mill points out, “Epicureans have 
always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human 
nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be 
capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.”  Id. at 55.  
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At the center of Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, and the 
element that makes utilitarianism more than merely an 
ethics of self-interest, is that, when one calculates how 
any particular action will maximize happiness, one must 
not privilege one’s own happiness over that of any other 
person.101  All human beings have equal value when 
calculating how much happiness there is in the world.102  
Therefore, even an action that threatens to impose pain on 
one individual or on a group of individuals might still be 
held to be ethical on a utilitarian calculus, as long as the 
totality of pleasure created by the action exceeds that 
pain.103  It is this universal nature of the utilitarian calculus 
that makes taxation ethically possible, since the “pain” 
imposed by the government collecting the tax will be offset 
by the pleasure created by the services the government 
provides with the revenue.104 
Mill’s emphasis that there are higher and lower 
pleasures, and that the higher pleasures are more 
ethically valuable than the lower ones, serves as the basis 
for thinking that Mill is concerned with more than just self-
interest.105  Mill goes on to explain that, for example, 
“justice” is nothing more than a higher pleasure that must 
 
101.  “[Impartiality] is involved in the very meaning of Utility, or the Greatest-
Happiness Principle.  That principle is a mere form of words without rational 
signification, unless one person’s happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the 
proper allowance made for kind), is counted for exactly as much as another’s.”  Id. 
at 105.  
102.  “[T]he happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in 
conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.  As between 
his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly 
impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”  Id. at 64.  
103.  Mill acknowledges that, in some instances, the good of others can only 
be achieved by the sacrifices of some.  “Though it is only in a very imperfect state 
of the world’s arrangements that anyone can best serve the happiness of others by 
the absolute sacrifice of his own, yet so long as the world is in that imperfect state, 
I fully acknowledge that the readiness to make such a sacrifice is the highest virtue 
which can be found in man.”  MILL, supra note 65, at 63. 
104.  Consequentialism, supra note 66.  Mill discusses taxation towards the 
end of Utilitarianism, primarily by criticizing non-consequentialist analyses of the 
justice of taxation.  MILL, supra note 65, at 102.  Mill claims that the only way out of 
the debate about the appropriate way to tax is with the application of utilitarian 
principles.  Id.  Having pointed out that some theories of justice will demand equal 
taxation from all, and others will require graduated tax, Mill states “[f]rom these 
confusions there is no other mode of extrication than the utilitarian.”  Id.  
105.  MILL, supra note 65, at 57. 
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be included in the utilitarian calculus.106  Justice is a term 
used regularly in most discussion of ethics.107  But Mill 
argues that justice has no meaning outside of the 
utilitarian calculus.  Valuing “justice,” even giving it 
absolute dominance over all other values, only 
demonstrates that what we call justice must be given great 
worth in the utilitarian calculus.108  Justice is nothing but a 
surfeit of pleasure produced by certain actions.109  Part of 
what often gets left out of discussions of the utilitarian 
calculus is Mill’s belief that, if people are, in fact, highly 
moral, then they will get pleasure from helping others.110  
A world that is just, by utilitarian measures, will tend 
towards equality, as those with means will experience 
happiness by sharing what they have with those who have 
less.111 
One consequence of Mill’s theory of utilitarianism for 
theories of government and social justice generally is that 
the best forms of government will be those that align the 
well-being of individuals with that of society as a whole.112  
When the choices that produce the most happiness for 
individuals also lead to the most happiness for all 
members of society, then individuals need not engage in a 
difficult moral calculus in determining the best action.113  
Instead, the choice of which action is most ethically 
appropriate will be obvious.  Mill believes that the power to 
align these interests effectively lies with the 
government. 114 
[L]aws and social arrangements should place the 
happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be 
called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly 
 
106.  See id. at 106. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 
109.  See id. at 93. 
110.  “[I]n a properly constituted world, the individual’s happiness will be 
found in doing what is morally right.”  MILL, supra note 65, at 5. 
111.  “The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of 
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others.  It only refuses to admit 
that the sacrifice is itself a good.  A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to 
increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted.”  Id. at 63-64. 
112.  Id. at 65-66. 
113.  Id. at 66. 
114.  Id. at 64. 
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as possible in harmony with the interest of the 
whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, 
which have so vast a power over human 
character, should so use that power as to 
establish in the mind of every individual an 
indissoluble association between his own 
happiness and the good of the whole; especially 
between his own happiness and the practice of 
such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as 
regard for the universal happiness prescribes:  so 
that not only he may be unable to conceive the 
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently 
with conduct opposed to the general good, but 
also that a direct impulse to promote the general 
good may be in every individual one of the 
habitual motives of action, and the sentiments 
connected therewith may fill a large and 
prominent place in every human being’s sentient 
existence.115 
That is to say, it is the task of the government to 
arrange affairs so that individuals see their incentives as 
aligned with the good of the whole, rather than in conflict 
with that good.  When members of a society understand 
that their utility is increased in concert with the utility of the 
rest of the world, then they are more likely to make 
choices that increase total utility, and are therefore moral 
choices, on utilitarian grounds. 
Since the ethical discourse of his day focused 
primarily on the language of justice and fairness, Mill 
spends a fair amount of his text contemplating what 
utilitarianism implies for notions of justice.  On Mill’s 
account, a strict application of utilitarian principles, where 
each individual’s happiness counts the same as any 
other’s, and where the higher pleasures, including those 
produced by social equality and fairness are preferred 
over the lower pleasures, will necessarily lead to a just 
society.116  Towards the end of Utilitarianism, Mill makes a 
prescient comment about the nature of justice in society.  
 
115.  MILL, supra note 65, at 64. 
116.  Id. at 106. 
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Observing that social norms about acceptable differences 
in treatment evolve over time, Mill contemplates the 
evolution of the understanding of justice in society within 
the utilitarian framework.117  Because utilitarianism 
demands that each individual be able to seek the 
maximization of happiness in the world, including his own 
individual happiness, utilitarianism contemplates in 
everyone “an equal claim to all the means of happiness, 
except in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, 
and the general interest in which that of every individual is 
included, sets limits to the maxim . . . .”118  Mill goes on to 
note that the evolution of justice in society reflects just this 
reality.119  People have been given the freedom to pursue 
their own happiness, unless and until that pursuit infringes 
on others.  Society regularly imposes restrictions on the 
ability of certain groups or individuals to pursue their own 
happiness.  As society evolves, those restrictions evolve 
as well, and we often identify as “unjust” what we 
previously saw as merely expedient.120  Mill emphasizes 
that a focus on maximizing social utility might allow us to 
avoid the kind of expediency that results in social norms 
 
117.  See id. 
118.  Id. 
119.  See id. at 106-07. 
120.  MILL, supra note 65, at 106.   
All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment, 
except when some recognised social expediency requires the 
reverse.  And hence all social inequalities which have ceased to be 
considered expedient, assume the character not of simple 
inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that people 
are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful 
that they themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an 
equally mistaken notion of expediency, the correction of which would 
make that which they approve seem quite as monstrous as what they 
have at last learnt to condemn.  The entire history of social 
improvement has been a series of transitions, by which one custom 
or institution after another, from being a supposed primary necessity 
of social existence, has passed into the rank of an universally 
stigmatized injustice and tyranny.  So it has been with the distinctions 
of slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; 
and so it will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of 
colour, race, and sex. 
 Id.  
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we later identify as unjust.121  The utilitarian standard 
treats all individuals as equally valuable, and Mill thinks 
this treatment might avoid the kind of injustice that has 
evolved under other ethical theories.122 
Mill’s theory of utilitarianism creates a set of ethical 
rules based on the measuring of pleasures and pains 
across a society.  Mill ultimately holds that there are 
meaningful differences between the higher and lower 
pleasures, and that among the higher pleasures are those 
that tend towards equality and justice.123  And since 
motives are irrelevant, from an ethical perspective, laws 








B. Welfare Economics 
Just as in its intellectual forebear, “utility” is the 
fundamental measure of value in the welfare economic 
model.125  While “utility” is the unified concept at the 
foundation of the economic calculus, welfare economists 
have also taken from Mill’s utilitarianism the notion that not 
all “utility” is the same.126  This view that not all happiness 
is equally valuable becomes manifest in the form of the 
 
121.  Id. 
122.  See id. 
123.  Id. at 56. 
124.  MILL, supra note 65, at 64. 
125.  As Louis Kaplow explains it, “The welfare economic approach to social 
assessment . . . determines the effects of any policy under consideration on each 
individual’s utility – also referred to as an individual’s well-being or welfare.  Thus 
. . . positive analysis entails identifying policies’ consequences for each individual.  
Second, to form a social assessment, the information on everyone’s utility is 
aggregated using a [social welfare function (SWF)], in particular an individualistic 
SWF, indicating that social welfare is a function (only) of individuals’ utilities.” 
KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 37. 
126.  See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus 
Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) (discussing the different perspectives of 
utility in welfare economics). 
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theory of declining marginal utility.127  Economists 
generally claim that it is impossible, in the abstract, to 
determine what provides utility to individual people.128  We 
have no way to see inside the minds of members of 
society, and doing thorough empirical research on the 
happiness producing outcomes of all members of society 
is impossible.  However, economics does not abandon the 
fundamental empiricism of the utilitarian theory.129  We 
must make judgments about utility based only on the 
information available to us.  Economics therefore focuses 
on the “expressed preferences” of members of society in 
order to determine utility.130  Most economic theories 
endorse the view that the most easily calculable 
expression of preferences is the use of money.131  
Therefore, welfare economic theorists conclude that it is 
reasonable to use money as a substitute for utility.132  
 
127.  Declining marginal utility is a fundamental premise of contemporary 
welfare economics, and, indeed, is considered so fundamental that is incorporated 
into introductory textbooks on the subject (although it is not a premise adopted by 
all economists).  See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 
447 (Joseph Sabatino et al. eds., 2012).   
128.  Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 113-14 (1979). 
129.  See id. at 107. 
130.  See generally Bryan Norton, Robert Costanza, and Richard C. Bishop, 
The Evolution of Preferences: Why “Sovereign” Preferences May Not Lead to 
Sustainable Policies and What to Do about It, 24 Ecological Econ. 193, 201 (1998) 
(“[C]laims that people do not behave according to the dictates of utility theory are 
particularly troubling to economists, whose theories assume that people are 
rational in the sense of having preferences that are complete and transitive and in 
the sense that they choose what they most prefer.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
131.  “[W]e can determine what people care about by what they buy and do 
not buy.”  Neil H. Buchanan, The Role of Economics in Tax Scholarship, in 
BEYOND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN UNITED STATES TAX LAW 11, 21 (David A. 
Brennen et al. eds., 2013). 
132.  See KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 359.   
It is familiar to economists that well-being or utility (the terms are 
used interchangeably throughout) is a broad, subjective notion, not 
one limited to material pleasures, hedonistic enjoyment, or any other 
a priori class of pleasures and pains.  Resources, often measured in 
monetary units, are means to obtain goods and services; these, in 
turn, are means to generating utility, which may be derived directly 
from goods or indirectly and intangibly, such as through fulfillment, 
sympathetic feelings for family and friends, aesthetic enjoyment of art 
or the environment, and so forth.  
KAPLOW, supra note 62, at 359.  
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While examining the financial choices people make in an 
attempt to identify their utility preferences might give us 
some insight into their individual utilitarian calculus, even 
limiting utility to a monetary calculus does not allow those 
seeking to apply welfare economic analysis to an issue to 
get a clear universalizable result.  Individuals have 
different preferences, even with regard to something as 
universal as money.  Retrieving reliable empirical 
information about those differing preferences is difficult, so 
welfare economics makes simplifying assumptions about 
the preferences of individuals.133  The primary simplifying 
assumption economists make is that everyone desires 
more money (utility).134  Therefore the action that 
produces more money will typically be the better action, 
according to a welfare economic analysis.135 
However, welfare economists also recognize that not 
all money is equal to all people.136  A dollar is worth much 
more to the person with only fifty dollars to her name than 
it is to Bill Gates.  The idea that a dollar is worth more to 
someone with less overall is known as declining marginal 
utility.137  “Marginal utility” is the usefulness of the last 
item, in comparison to the item immediately before it.138  If 
one’s marginal utility declines, then the last item is less 
useful than the second to last item.139  This theory of the 
declining marginal value of money, and its extension to a 
 
[L]egal scholars have traditionally tried to avoid specifically defining 
what constitutes utility, happiness, or well-being.  Instead, legal 
scholars use proxies such as liberty and money, which are thought to 
influence happiness or well-being, regardless of the precise way in 
which happiness or well-being is defined.  To that end, utilitarianism 
as traditionally applied in tax policy uses income or wealth as a proxy 
for utility and assumes the declining marginal utility thereof . . . .  
Fleischer, supra note 16, at 1505 (footnotes omitted).  “[I]t may not be possible to 
measure utility at all.”  Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility 
and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 909 (2011). 
133.  See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 905. 
134.  See Posner, supra note 128, at 119. 
135.  Id. 
136.  MANKIW, supra note 127. 
137.  See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 915. 
138.  Id. 
139.  Id.  “[D]eclining marginal utility of income means each dollar is worth 
less than the dollar before.  (‘Marginal’ utility of income refers, of course, to the 
utility of the dollar ‘at the margin,’ that is, the last dollar.)”  Id.  
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theory of declining marginal utility more broadly, is 
generally accepted by welfare economists.140  Declining 
marginal utility allows economic theory to incorporate a 
social welfare component by arguing that the allocation of 
goods between higher and lower income members of 
society can include an estimation of the value of those 
goods to each potential recipient.141  If the theory of 
declining marginal utility indicates that a particular good 
will be less valuable to the higher income (or higher 
wealth) individual, then the utilitarian goal can be met by 
allocating that good to the lower income (or lower wealth) 
individual.142  This theory of declining marginal utility 
justifies progressive taxation, of both the income and 
wealth transfer variety.143  Because the last dollar earned 
by the wealthier individual provides little value to her, the 
government can take that dollar, in the form of a tax, and 
transfer it to a less wealthy individual, usually in the form 
of services, but sometimes in the form of a direct financial 
transfer, as in the refundable income tax credits aimed at 
low income taxpayers.144 
C. Classical Utilitarianism Is Not Welfare Economics 
As should now be clear, there are significant 
differences between classical utilitarianism and its 
modern-day interpretation in welfare economics.  In an 
attempt to simplify the utilitarian calculus and make it 
useful in determining real-world policies, including tax 
policies, welfare economics has left behind Mill’s view that 
higher pleasures, like the pleasures of justice and equality, 
 
140.  “The assumption of declining marginal utility of income – that the next 
dollar a person receives is “worth less” to a wealthy person than a poor person – 
has been crucial in tax scholarship over the last sixty or so years, as optimal tax 
theory and welfarism have become important ways that many in the legal academy 
evaluate tax policy.”  Id. at 904. 
141.  See MANKIW, supra note 127. 
142.  See Lawsky, supra note 132, at 917. 
143.  See id. 
144.  For an explanation and discussion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
which is the largest direct transfer to low-income taxpayers through the Federal 
Income Tax, see generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of Redistribution? An 
Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit 74 MO. L. REV. 251 (2009) (presenting 
the history of the EITC through its current form, reviewing its critics, and proposing 
adjustments). 
724 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69:695 
must be valued more highly in determining the correct 
course of action.145  While more sophisticated versions of 
welfare economics include a “social welfare function” that 
can incorporate the values of justice and equality as 
values a society holds,146 most welfare economists do not 
endorse the view held by Mill that those values are, in fact, 
more valuable than other values.147  This resistance to 
ranking preferences, outside of the ranking permitted by 
applying a theory of declining marginal utility, makes it 
harder to justify equality-producing laws on a welfare 
economic basis.148 
What makes Millian utilitarianism a more robust 
ethical theory than a simple “greatest good for the greatest 
number” arithmetic calculation is that Mill believed that the 
higher pleasures received additional weight in that ethical 
calculation.149  Because not all pleasures are alike, 
determining the correct utilitarian outcome requires not 
just determining the raw number of pleasures produced by 
an action, nor even comparing the intensity and duration 
of those pleasures, as Bentham would claim.150  Mill’s 
theory introduces the idea that pleasures of a higher order 
must be preferred above the lower pleasures.151  And 
included in those higher pleasures are the social goods we 
identify as justice and equality.152  Because these 
pleasures are of such a greater magnitude than the lower 
 
145.  See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 979-80 (2001). 
146.  For an explanation of the role of the social welfare function, see 
KAPLOW, supra note 62. 
147.  See Guido Calabresi, Of Tastes and Values, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
313, 316 (2014). 
148.  See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85, 88 (1985). 
149.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 56. 
150.  See id.; Jeremy Bentham, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bentham/ [https://perma.cc/M83U-K4BJ] 
(published March 17, 2015) (describing Bentham’s “felicific calculus,” which “[t]o an 
individual the value of a pain or pleasure will be more or less according to its 
intensity, duration, . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
151.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 59. 
152.  Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ mill-moral-political/ [https://perma.cc/K4SR-XNTQ] 
(published October 9, 2007 and substantially revised August 22, 2014) (“Justice 
implies something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which 
some individual person can claim from us as a matter of right.”). 
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pleasure of satisfying self-interest, much social policy and 
law could be designed to achieve the higher pleasures of 
justice and equality.  While the use of the social welfare 
function in welfare economics goes some way towards 
allowing the utilitarian calculus to prefer certain kinds of 
pleasure (or utility) over others, welfare economics does 
not go so far as to say that some forms of utility are by 
their very nature to be preferred over others.153 
Of course, one objection to Millian utilitarianism is that 
Mill claims that some pleasures are greater and more 
valuable than others without providing any criteria by 
which to determine which pleasures those are.154  His 
elitist claim that Socrates and his ilk are better judges than 
the lowly pig of what true pleasure is gives us some insight 
into Mill’s beliefs regarding the higher and lower 
pleasures, but very little information about how the 
utilitarian calculus ought to be applied in society.155  
Welfare economics responds by leaving this element of 
Mill’s theory out of its take-up of utilitarianism,156 but by 
leaving this element behind, welfare economics loses 
some of the ethical force of Mill’s original theory.  There 
may be legitimate objections to the argument that some 
pleasures are more meaningful and valuable than others, 
but abandoning that portion of the theory without replacing 
it with another element risks making the theory 
unintelligible. 
IV.  WHAT DOES UTILITARIANISM SAY ABOUT 
WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION? 
At the heart of Mill’s ethical argument is a belief that 
the moral actor experiences pleasure, and therefore 
makes ethical choices, by performing the action that 
promotes the good of the entire community, rather than 
 
153.  See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80. 
154.  See Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, supra note 152 (“[E]ven if we 
can distinguish higher and lower pleasures, according to their causes, it remains 
unclear how the hedonist is to explain how higher pleasures are inherently more 
pleasurable.”). 
155.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 57. 
156.  See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 145, at 979-80. 
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based solely on his own self-interest.157  At first glance this 
might seem to indicate that a moral society does not need 
wealth transfer taxation, since individuals acting in 
accordance with utilitarian ethical theory will make choices 
about the distribution of their wealth that will tend towards 
an increase in the happiness of the entire society.  The 
natural goals of all individuals to maximize their own utility 
will lead them to redistribute their own wealth, making 
direct transfers to those members of society who have 
less, until society becomes more or less equal.  With this 
sort of self-motivated redistribution, one of the central 
functions of taxation would be eliminated.158  However, 
Mill does not expect that all individuals will share the 
appropriate utilitarian motivation from the outset.159  We 
are, as Mill notes, becoming more ethical, and since 
utilitarianism is an empirical approach, more information 
about the world results in more and more ethical 
behavior.160  But until individuals become sufficiently 
aware of their own utility and how best to maximize 
happiness (by recognizing that a more equal society 
promotes the most happiness, says Mill), we may need 
 
157.  MILL, supra note 65, at 64. 
[U]tility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should 
place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the 
interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the 
interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, 
which have so vast a power over human character, should so use 
that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an 
indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of 
the whole . . . so that not only he may be unable to conceive the 
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed 
to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the 
general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives 
of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and 
prominent place in every human being’s sentient existence. 
Id. 
158.  Federal tax performs several functions, many of which could not be 
achieved merely by relying on self-motivated redistribution, such as military 
spending, environmental and investment regulation, or foreign policy.  However, 
one motivation for taxation, and especially for progressive taxation (including the 
estate tax) and spending programs aimed at the least well-off members of society, 
is the goal of having a more equitable distribution of wealth in society.  See TAX 
PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 2-3 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994). 
159.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 70. 
160.  See id. 
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laws that encourage us to act in a way that is most likely to 
produce that happiness.  And importantly, Mill’s 
consequentialist ethics is unconcerned with motives, 
counting as ethical an action that increases overall 
happiness, whether or not that action is motivated by a 
desire on the part of the actor to act ethically.161  
Consequentialist ethical theories concern themselves only 
with the result of an action, such that “ethical intentions” 
count for little to nothing in consequentialist theories.162  
Mill’s utilitarian ethics counts as ethical any action that 
does, in fact, increase utility/happiness, whether or not the 
intention of the actor is to increase utility/happiness.163  
Therefore, if it were demonstrated that any particular 
government plan would increase overall happiness, then 
analyzing that plan from the utilitarian perspective would 
lead to an endorsement of that plan.  For purposes of this 
article, the question to be considered is whether or not 
adopting utilitarianism would lead to the endorsement of a 
system of wealth transfer taxation.  If a heavily 
redistributive wealth transfer taxation did, in fact, increase 
overall happiness, then a utilitarian analysis would 
endorse that tax. 
In determining whether or not utilitarianism leads to 
the conclusion that wealth transfer taxation is ethically 
justified, one must consider another essential element of 
Mill’s classical utilitarian calculus—the fact that not all 
pleasures are equally valuable.  Classical utilitarianism is 
 
161.   See MILL, supra note 65, at 65. 
[Critics of utilitarianism] say it is exacting too much to require that 
people shall always act from the inducement of promoting the 
general interests of society.  But this is to mistake the very meaning 
of a standard of morals, and to confound the rule of action with the 
motive of it.  It is the business of ethics to tell us what are our duties, 
or by what test we may know them; but no system of ethics requires 
that the sole motive of all we do shall be a feeling of duty; on the 
contrary, ninety-nine hundreths of all our actions are done from other 
motives, and rightly so done, if the rule of duty does not condemn 
them.  [T]he motive has nothing to do with the morality of the 
action . . . . 
Id. 
162.  Id. at 14. 
163.  Id. at 65. 
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still primarily empirical, so performing a utilitarian calculus 
does, to a certain extent, depend upon empirical evidence 
of the utility provided in various scenarios.  Empirical 
research on the effects of various wealth transfer tax 
schemes is outside of the scope of this project.  Despite 
that, there is evidence examining the general well-being of 
societies with more or less equitable distributions of 
wealth.164  Sophisticated welfare economics research 
does include these insights in determining the utility of 
particular actions.165  Utilitarianism would require this 
weighing of pleasures as well.  Because some pleasures 
are higher than others, the utilitarian calculus must weight 
those particular sources of pleasure more heavily.  
Therefore, evaluations of wealth transfer taxation that 
consider only the utility of the decedent/donor or the heir, 
or evaluations that consider those utilities in comparison 
with the utility of a more equitable society, but give all 
those estimations of utility equal weight, will miss the point 
of classical utilitarianism.  Mill claimed that the quality of 
higher pleasures like justice and equality were so intense 
as to make them infinitely more valuable than any other 
source of pleasure.166  Since robust utilitarianism 
evaluates pleasures based not merely on their intensity or 
duration, but also on the quality of the pleasure, it does not 
go too far to say that utilitarianism is consistent with robust 
redistribution.  While this redistribution could be achieved 
through other methods of taxation, using wealth transfer 
taxation to effect that redistribution targets the tax at 
combating the concentration of wealth in a way that 
income taxation does not.167 
While it seems evident that utilitarianism is consistent 
with and, indeed, might even demand heavily redistributive 
taxation, without more empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of different forms of taxation on the utility of those 
 
164.  Mill himself, writing 150 years ago, believed society was poised to wipe 
out poverty and the suffering it caused.  “Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, 
may be completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined with the good 
sense and providence of individuals.”  Id. at 62.  
165.  See James R. Repetti, Should We Tax the Gratuitous Transfer of 
Wealth? An Introduction, 57 B.C. L. REV. 815, 817-18 (2016). 
166.  See MILL, supra note 65, at 98. 
167.  See Moran, supra note 28, at 329. 
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involved, it is difficult to say what form that redistributive 
taxation should take.  There are reasons to believe that 
wealth transfer taxation does more in a more direct way to 
combat unequal wealth distributions than do other forms of 
tax, such as income or consumption taxes.  However, 
even within the category of wealth transfer taxation there 
are many possible options for organizing the tax.  An 
inheritance or accessions tax would impose a tax on the 
recipient of the transfer, which is likely the best way to 
achieve more equality of outcome, especially if the 
revenue raised from the tax is then used to increase 
opportunities available to the least well-off members of 
society.168  However, even an estate and gift tax system 
like the one currently in place in the United States—if the 
exemption levels were reduced, if the rates were 
increased, and if the valuations were more robustly 
enforced—could increase utility and happiness by 
decreasing the concentration of wealth and increasing 
social justice.  Achieving this utilitarian ethical result would 
depend on using the revenue raised through the estate 
and gift taxes to achieve a more equitable society, which 
would balance the cost of any pain produced by the 
imposition of the tax.169 
 
 
168.  For a discussion of the role of inheritance taxation in increasing equality 
of opportunity, see Bird-Pollan, supra text accompanying note 6.  For a discussion 
of the use of an accessions tax to combat the intergenerational transfer of political 
power, see generally Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to 
Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016), proposing that an 
accessions tax is superior to other options for taxing wealth transfers in achieving 
the goal of minimizing dynastic wealth transfers. 
169.  A utilitarian may be especially drawn to the use of an estate tax to 
achieve these redistributive goals, since the tax is only collected after the death of 
the taxpayer.  Therefore, the pain suffered by that taxpayer is only the pain of the 
anticipation of paying the tax, rather than the actual pain or unhappiness 
experienced by paying the tax.  Of course, the heir to the wealth may feel some 
unhappiness knowing that her inheritance is smaller, due to the burden of the tax, 
but that pain might also be mitigated by the knowledge that the legal system allows 
the inheritance to proceed, thereby enriching the heir with the wealth of the 
decedent.  See generally Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth Transfers: A 
Philosophical Analysis, 57 B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016) (applying philosophical analysis 
to the question of wealth transfer taxation and proposing that “a robust system of 
wealth transfer taxation is best suited to combat . . . inequality in the twenty-first 
century” and that “wealth transfer taxation is consistent with most philosophical 
belief systems”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the current state of wealth 
transfer taxation in the United States and applied the 
utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill to an analysis of wealth 
transfer taxation more broadly.  This utilitarian analysis is 
an important step in the tax policy debate, as many U.S. 
taxpayer/voters, as well as numerous tax policy scholars, 
embrace utilitarianism as a philosophical approach.  A 
utilitarian analysis that demonstrates that robust wealth 
transfer taxation is endorsed by a theoretically consistent 
utilitarian philosophy moves the conversation about the 
future of the estate tax forward.  Much political debate 
about the estate and gift tax system is mired in convoluted 
and confused versions of poor philosophical 
argumentation.  This article clarifies the utilitarian view, 
and carefully applies that view to the arguments around 
wealth transfer taxation. 
Because the utilitarian calculus espoused by Mill 
permits a ranking of pleasures, valuing “higher” pleasures 
more than “lower” pleasures, and because equality and 
justice are higher pleasures on Mill’s analysis, taxation 
that redistributes wealth in order to create a more equal 
society will be judged ethical under Mill’s utilitarianism.  
While this redistribution need not necessarily come in the 
form of wealth transfer taxation, under the current system 
of taxation in the United States, the taxation of wealth 
transfers is the most heavily redistributive tax, collecting 
tax only from the wealthiest members of society, and, 
primarily, only after they have died.  While a utilitarian 
evaluation of the current federal wealth transfer taxes 
must consider the loss of utility felt by the individual 
subject to the tax, and by any heir who receives a smaller 
inheritance as a result of the tax, those will be lower pains, 
insufficient to offset the higher pleasure of increased social 
equality. 
 
